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Abstract. The quest for a scientific description of consciousness has
given rise to new theoretical and empirical paradigms for the investiga-
tion of phenomenological contents as well as clinical disorders of con-
sciousness. An outstanding challenge in the field is to develop measures
that uniquely quantify global brain states tied to consciousness. In partic-
ular, information-theoretic complexity measures such as integrated infor-
mation have recently been proposed as measures of conscious awareness.
This suggests a new framework to quantitatively classify states of con-
sciousness. However, it has proven increasingly difficult to apply these
complexity measures to realistic brain networks. In part, this is due to
high computational costs incurred when implementing these measures on
realistically large network dimensions. Nonetheless, complexity measures
for quantifying states of consciousness are important for assisting clinical
diagnosis and therapy. This article is meant to serve as a lookup table
of measures of consciousness, with particular emphasis on clinical appli-
cability of these measures. We consider both, principle-based complexity
measures as well as empirical measures tested on patients. We address
challenges facing these measures with regard to realistic brain networks,
and where necessary, suggest possible resolutions.
Keywords: Consciousness in the Clinic, Computational Neuroscience,
Complexity Measures.
1 Introduction
In patients with disorders of consciousness, such as coma, locked-in syndrome
or vegetative state, levels of consciousness are assessed in the clinic through
a battery of behavioral tests and neurophysiological recordings. In particular,
these methods are used to assess levels of wakefulness (arousal) and awareness
in patients [28], [27]. Such assessments have led to a two dimensional operational
definition of consciousness for clinical purposes. Assessments of awareness use
behavioral and neurophysiological (fMRI or EEG) protocols in order to gauge
how patients perform on various cognitive functions. Assessments of wakefulness
are based on metabolic markers (if reporting is not possible) such as
uptake in the brain, captured using PET scans [17]. As such a clinically-oriented
definition of consciousness enables classification of closely associated states and
disorders of consciousness into clusters on a bivariate scale with awareness and
wakefulness on orthogonal axes. Under healthy conditions, these two levels are
almost linearly correlated, as in conscious wakefulness (high arousal and high
awareness) or in deep sleep (low arousal and low awareness). However, in patho-
logical states, wakefulness without awareness can be observed in the vegetative
state [28], while transiently reduced awareness is observed following seizures [16].
Patients in the minimally conscious state show intermittent and limited non-
reflexive and purposeful behavior [20], [19], whereas patients with hemi-spatial
neglect display reduced awareness of stimuli contralateral to the side where brain
damage has occurred [30]. Given the aforementioned scales for labeling states
and disorders of consciousness, the crucial question is how should one quantify
awareness and wakefulness from neurophysiological data? This is particularly
useful for non-communicative patients such as those in coma or states of min-
imal wakefulness. For this reason, several dynamical complexity measures have
been developed. In this article, we first describe theoretically-grounded com-
plexity measures and the challenges one faces when applying these measures to
realistic brain data. We then outline alternative empirical approaches to classify
states and disorders of consciousness. We end with a discussion on how these
two approaches might inform each other.
2 Measures of Integrated Information
Dynamical complexity measures are designed to capture both, network topol-
ogy as well as causal dynamics. The most prominent among these is integrated
information, denoted as Φ. This was first introduced in [37] and is defined as
the quantity of information generated by a network as a whole, over and above
that of its parts, taking into account the system’s causal dynamical interactions.
This reflects the intuition going back to William James that conscious states
are integrated, yet diverse. Φ seeks to operationalize this intuition in terms of
complexity, stating that complexity arises from simultaneous integration and dif-
ferentiation of the network’s structure as well as dynamics. Differentiation refers
to functional specialization of neural populations, while integration, as a com-
plementary design principle, results in distributed coordination among neural
populations. This interplay generates integrated yet diversified information be-
lieved to support cognitive and behavioral states. The earliest proposals defining
integrated information were made in [37], [36] and [34]. Since then, considerable
progress has been made towards the development of a normative theory as well
as applications of integrated information [12], [14], [35], [1], [29], [7], [8], [26], [33],
[5]. The core idea of integrated information as a whole versus parts quantity has
been formalized in several distinct information measures such as neural com-
plexity [37], causal density [32], Φ from integrated information theory: IIT 1.0,
2.0 & 3.0 [34], [12], [29], stochastic interaction [39], [11], stochastic integrated
information [14], [1], [9] and synergistic Φ [23], [22]. Table 1 summarizes these
measures along with corresponding information metrics upon which they have
been based.
Table 1. Theoretical complexity measures alongside their corresponding information
metrics.
Integrated Information Measures Information Metrics
Neural Complexity Mutual Information (MI)
Causal Density Granger Causality (GC)
Stochastic Interaction Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD)
IIT 1.0 & 2.0 KLD
Stochastic Integrated Information MI or KLD
IIT 3.0 Earth Mover’s Distance
Synergistic Φ Synergistic Information
However, computing integrated information for large neurophysiological datasets
has been challenging due to both, computational difficulties and limits on do-
mains where these measures can be implemented. For instance, many of these
measures use the minimum information partition of the network. This involves
evaluating a large number of network configurations (more precisely, the Bell
number), which makes their computational cost extremely high for large net-
works. As for domains of applicability, the measure of [12] has been formu-
lated for discrete-state, deterministic, Markovian systems with the maximum
entropy distribution. On the other hand, the measure of [14] has been devised
to continuous-state, stochastic, non-Markovian systems and in principle, admits
dynamics with any empirical distribution (although in practice, it is easier to use
assuming Gaussian distributions). The formulation in [14] is based on mutual
information, whereas [12] uses a measure based on the Kullback-Leibler diver-
gence. Note however, that in some cases the measure of [14] can take negative
values and that complicates its interpretation. The Kullback-Leibler based defi-
nition computes the information generated during state transitions and remains
positive in the regime of stable dynamics. This gives it a natural interpretation
as an integrated information measure. Both measures [12], [14] make use of a
normalization scheme in their formulations. Normalization inadvertently intro-
duces ambiguities in computations. The normalization is actually used for the
purpose of determining the partition of the network that minimizes the inte-
grated information, but a normalization dependent choice of partition ends up
influencing the value and interpretation of Φ. An alternate measure based on the
Earth Mover’s distance was proposed in [29]. This does away with the normaliza-
tion problem (though the current version is not formulated for continuous-state
variables). However, the formulation of [29] lies outside the scope of standard
information theory and is still difficult for performing computations on large
networks.
More recently, these issues have been addressed in [9], using a formulation
of stochastic integrated information based on the Kullback-Leibler divergence
between the conditional multivariate distribution on the set of network states
versus the corresponding factorized distribution over its parts, while implement-
ing the maximum information partition instead of the minimum information
partition. Using this formulation, Φ can be computed for large-scale networks
with linear stochastic dynamics, for both, attractor as well as non-stationary
states [9] (for network simulations see [2], [3], [10]). This work also demonstrated
the first computation of Φ for the resting-state human brain connectome. The
connectome network is estimated from cortical white matter tractography data,
comprising 998 voxels (nodes) with approximately 28,000 weighted symmetric
connections [24]. [9] show that the dynamics and topology of the healthy resting-
state brain generates greater information complexity than a (weight-preserving)
random rewiring of the same network. Even though this formulation of stochas-
tic integrated information was successfully implemented for the human cerebral
connectome, a network of 998 nodes and about 28,000 edges, it was limited to
linearized dynamics. This is well-defined in the vicinity of attractor states such
as the resting-state, however, it would be desirable to extend this formulation to
include non-linearities existing in brain dynamics.
3 Empirical Measures
Ideally, integrated information was intended as a measure of awareness, one that
could account for informational differences between states and also disorders
of consciousness. However, as described above, for realistic brain dynamics and
physiological data that task has in fact proven difficult. On the other hand, the
basic conceptualization of consciousness in terms of integration and differentia-
tion of causal information has motivated several empirical measures that seek to
classify consciousness-related disorders from patient data. For example, [13] in-
vestigated changes in conscious levels using Granger Causality (GC) as a causal
connectivity measure. Given two stationary time-series signals, Granger Causal-
ity measures the extent to which the past of one assists in predicting the future
of the other, over and above the extent to which the past of the latter already
predicts its own future [21], thus quantifying causal relations between two sig-
naling sources. This was tested using electroencephalographic (EEG) data from
subjects undergoing propofol-induced anesthesia, with signals source-localized
to the anterior and posterior cingulate cortices. [13] found a significant increases
in bidirectional GC in most subjects during loss of consciousness, especially in
the beta and gamma frequency ranges. Another useful measure of causal connec-
tivity is transfer entropy, which extends Granger causality to the non-Gaussian
case. However, so far this has only been implemented on neuronal cultures by
[40] and holds future potential as a clinically relevant measure. Yet another
measure that has already proven useful as a clinical classifier of conscious lev-
els is the Perturbational Complexity Index (PCI), which was introduced by [18]
and tested on TMS-evoked potentials measured with EEG. PCI is calculated
by perturbing the cortex with transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) in or-
der to engage distributed interactions in the brain and then compressing the
resulting spatiotemporal EEG responses to measure their algorithmic complex-
ity, based on the Lempel-Ziv compression. For a given segment of EEG data,
the Lempel-Ziv algorithm quantifies complexity by counting the number of dis-
tinct patterns in the data. For example, this can be proportional to the size
of a computer file after applying a data compression algorithm. Computing the
Lempel-Ziv compressibility requires binarizing the time-series data, based either
on event-related potentials or with respect to a given threshold. Using PCI, [18]
were able to discriminate levels of consciousness during wakefulness, sleep, and
anesthesia, as well as in patients who had emerged from coma and recovered a
minimal level of consciousness. Later, the Lempel-Ziv complexity was also used
by [31] on spontaneous high-density EEG data recorded from subjects under-
going propofol-induced anesthesia. Once again, a robust decline in complexity
was observed during anesthesia. These are complexity measures based on data
compression algorithms. A qualitative comparison between a data compression
measure inspired by PCI and Φ was made in [38]. While compression-based
measures do seem to capture certain aspects of Φ, the exact relationship be-
tween the two is not completely clear. Nonetheless, these empirical measures
have been useful for clinical purposes, in terms of broadly discriminating dis-
orders of consciousness. Another relevant complexity measure is the weighted
symbolic mutual information (wSMI), introduced by [25]. This is a measure of
global information sharing across brain areas. It evaluates the extent to which
two EEG channels present nonrandom joint fluctuations, suggesting that they
share common sources. This is done by first transforming continuous signals into
discrete symbols, and subsequently computing the joint probabilities of symbol
pairs between two EEG channels. Before computing the symbolic mutual infor-
mation between two time-series signals, a weighting is introduced to disregard
conjunctions of identical or opposite-sign symbols from the two signal trains as
that could potentially arise from common-source artifacts. In [25] wSMI was
estimated for 181 EEG recordings from awake but noncommunicating patients
diagnosed in various disorders of consciousness (including 143 from patients in
vegetative and minimally conscious states). This measure of information sharing
was found to systematically increases with consciousness. In particular, it was
able to distinguish patients in the vegetative state, minimally conscious state,
and fully conscious state. In Table 2 we summarize the above empirical mea-
sures along with their domains of application.
4 Discussion
The paradigm-shifting proposal that consciousness might be measurable in terms
of the information generated by causal dynamics of the brain as a whole, over
the sum of its parts, has led to precise quantitative formulations of information-
theoretic complexity measures. These measures seek to operationalize the intu-
ition that the complexity associated to consciousness arises from simultaneous
integration and differentiation of the brain’s structural and dynamical hierar-
chies. However, progress in this direction has faced practical challenges such
Table 2. Empirical complexity measures alongside their tested domains of application.
Empirical Measures Tested Application Domains
Granger Causality Wakefulness vs propofol-induced
anesthesia using EEG
Perturbational Complexity Index Wakefulness, sleep, anesthesia, coma & minimal
consciousness using TMS-evoked EEG
Lempel-Ziv Complexity Wakefulness vs propofol-induced
anesthesia using EEG
Weighted Symbolic Mutual Information Vegetative, minimally conscious &
fully conscious states using EEG
as high computational cost upon scaling with network size. This is especially
true with regard to realistic neuroimaging or physiological datasets. Even in the
approach of [9], where both, the scaling and normalization problem have been
solved, the formulation is still applicable only to linear dynamical systems. A
possible way to extend this formulation to non-linear systems such as the brain
might be to first solve the Fokker-Planck equations for these systems (as prob-
ability distributions will no longer remain Gaussian) and subsequently estimate
entropies and conditional entropies numerically to compute Φ. Another solution
to the problem might be to construct statistical estimators for the covariance
matrices from data and then compute Φ.
In the meanwhile, for clinical purposes, it has been useful to consider empiri-
cal complexity measures, which serve as classifiers that very broadly discriminate
states of consciousness, such as between wakefulness and anesthesia or broadly
between disorders of consciousness. However, these measures do not strictly cor-
respond to integrated information. Some of them are based on signal compres-
sion, which does capture differentiation, though not directly integration. So far
these methods have been applied on the scale of EEG datasets. One has yet to
demonstrate their computational feasibility for larger datasets (which might only
be a matter of time though). All in all, bottom-up approaches suggest important
features that might help inform or constrain implementations of principle-based
approaches. However, the latter are indispensable for ultimately understanding
causal aspects of information generation and flow in the brain.
This article is intended as a lookup table spanning the landscape of both,
theoretically-motivated as well as empirically-based complexity measures used in
current consciousness research. Even though, for the purpose of this article, we
have treated complexity as a global correlate of consciousness, there are indica-
tions that multiple complexity types, based on cognitive and behavioral control,
might be important for a more precise classification of various states of con-
sciousness [15], [6]. This latter observation alludes to the need for an integrative
systems approach to consciousness research, one that is grounded in cognitive
architectures and helps understand control mechanisms underlying systems level
neural information processing [4].
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